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Abstract
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model
of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged
that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual
strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically
are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this omission by analyzing the role of
positive and negative externalities of link formation. This yields general results that
relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too
dense” in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities tend to
induce “too dense” networks.
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Introduction

The importance of social and economic networks has been widely recognized in economics,
as well as in other social sciences. Applications include personal contacts (e.g. Granovetter, 1974), scientific collaborations (e.g. Newman, 2004), trade between countries
(e.g. Goyal and Joshi, 2006b), embeddedness of companies (e.g. Uzzi, 1996), and even
marriages of ancient trading families (Padgett and Ansell, 1993).
Given the prevalence of network structure in many economic situations, it seems natural
to ask how networks change, when agents alter the network structure in order to pursue
their goals. It was a major contribution of the economics literature to propose such models
based on game theoretic concepts. The first non-cooperative game theoretic approach to
two-sided network formation can be found in Myerson (1991). Myerson (1991) proposes
a simultaneous move game of network formation, where players announce their desired
links non-cooperatively. A link between two players is formed if both players announce
it.
Alike in non-cooperative game theory, a central issue in the theory of network formation is
the analysis of equilibrium or stability, i.e. a situation where no player wants to change her
links. The standard formulation of Nash-equilibrium in the Myerson network formation
game has proved to be a non-satisfying concept due to coordination problems.1 The
seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) solves this problem by introducing
a different concept of stability called pairwise stability. In a pairwise stable network no
two players want to form a mutual link and no player wants to cut a link unilaterally.
This concept of stability is used and has been refined widely in the literature of network
formation games.2 For different models of network formation, Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) characterized pairwise stable and efficient networks by introducing the utilitarian
welfare function.3 They highlight a central problem in strategic network formation: there
is a tension between stability and efficiency, meaning that individual interest can be
at odds with societal welfare. Since then, there was a flourishing literature on specific
situations of strategic network formation of which two small surveys can be found in
Jackson (2004) and Goyal and Joshi (2006a). Some models can be found that analyze the
formation of directed networks, e.g. Bala and Goyal (2000), and weighted networks, Bloch
and Dutta (2005) and Rogers (2006). The various network formation games provide microbased models and analyze which networks are stable under various notions of stability
and which are efficient.
What has not been explicitly studied are the sources of inefficiency. The question is
particularly, how stable networks generally differ from efficient networks? And, why
individual interest does not always lead to efficient outcomes?
We approach these questions by analyzing the role of externalities, or spillovers, of link
formation. Simply put, positive externalities define situations where agents can profit
1

Any link, that is desired by both players is not necessarily present in Nash-equilibrium if neither
player announces it, e.g. the empty network is always an equilibrium.
2
Among the most well-known refinements are pairwise Nash stability, Bloch and Jackson (2006);
unilateral stability, Buskens and Van de Rijt (2005); strong stability, Jackson and Van de Nouweland
(2005); and bilateral stability, Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
3
E.g. the connections model and the co-author model.
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(at least do not suffer) from others who form a relationship; while negative externalities
mean that they do not benefit from that action. We argue that both types of externalities
correspond to natural settings. Network formation games where direct and indirect
connections are the source of benefits represent examples for positive externalities. On
the other hand, in a context of competition or rival goods, negative externalities occur.
To compare stable and efficient networks in both contexts, we firstly employ and analyze
two well-known notions of stability: pairwise stability, as introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and pairwise stability with transfers, which stems from a network formation
game allowing for transfers.4 In addition to our main findings, we also elaborate on the
relation of these concepts. In analyzing the welfare properties of these stable networks,
we use a very general set of welfare functions, which have to satisfy only a monotonicity
property.5 Given a welfare function, we introduce the notion of over-connected and underconnected networks. In essence, a network is over-connected if welfare can be improved by
deleting some links, while a network is under-connected if an addition of links is welfare
improving. We show how this notion helps identify the sources of inefficiencies and can
be applied to characterizing stable and efficient networks.
The main result for positive externalities is that there is no stable network that can be
socially improved by the severance of links. This result is not dependent on the particular
shape of the utility functions nor on the degree of homogeneity. We provide some examples
taken from literature – among them is the connections model (see Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996) – and illustrate the implications of the result. For negative externalities the tension
between stability and efficiency is just the other way round: In various models of network
formation, we observe that efficient networks are altered by individuals adding links, a
process that leads to stable networks which are “too dense” from a societal point of view.
In the context of transfers, we show that no stable network can be socially improved by
the addition of links. Without the assumption of transfers, additional insights are won
by restricting attention to a large class of network formation models, where the utility
function only depends on the number of links all the players have. Among them are the
co-author model, firstly introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and the model of
patent races by Goyal and Joshi (2006a). Furthermore, we derive properties of the utility
function that are sufficient for equivalence between pairwise stability with transfers and
pairwise stability. In that case, the result of not being under-connected carries over to
pairwise stable networks.
Finally, we extend our analysis to a more general framework that is not restricted to
undirected and unweighted networks. The framework includes the formation of networks
with directed ties, weighted ties, negative ties, and networks with loops (self-links).
The first result addresses models of bilateral network formation, in which a condition
called “rejection power” is satisfied. This includes all models based on the Myerson
link announcement game. We show for positive externalities that a Nash stable network
cannot be over-connected. The second result addresses virtually any model of unilateral
network formation. It shows for negative externalities (and positive externalities), that
4

See Bloch and Jackson (2007) for different approaches to network formation allowing for transfers.
For a comparison of the two equilibrium concepts see Bloch and Jackson (2006).
5
The utilitarian welfare function satisfies this notion. For some of the results, we actually need this
specific version of a welfare function.
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a Nash stable network cannot be under-connected (respectively over-connected). This
result, holding for the general class of monotonic welfare functions, is briefly discussed
with respect to the models of Bala and Goyal (2000).
The paper is organized as follows: the subsequent section formally defines the model. The
implications of positive externalities on the tension of stability and efficiency are shown
in Section 3. Section 4 addresses negative externalities and relates the different stability
notions. Section 5 presents an extension of our model. More specifically, we verify how
our results carry over to a framework that includes the formation of weighted and directed
ties. Section 6 concludes.

2

Model and Definitions

Let N = {1, ..., n} be a (finite, fixed) set of agents/players, with n ≥ 3. A network/graph
g is a set of unordered pairs, {i, j} with i 6= j ∈ N, that represent the bilateral connections
in a non-directed graph. Thus, ij := {i, j} ∈ g means that player i and player j are linked
in network g. Let g N be the set of all subsets of N of size two and G be the set of all
possible graphs, G = {g : g ⊆ g N }.
By Ni (g) we denote the neighbors of player i in network g, Ni (g) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}.
Similarly, Li (g) denotes the set of player i’s links in g, Li (g) := {ij ∈ g | j ∈ N}. We
define di (g) := |Li (g)| = |Ni (g)|, as the number of player i’s links, called player i’s degree.
For each player i ∈ N a utility function ui : G → R expresses his preferences over the
set of possible graphs. u = (u1 , ...un ) denotes the profile of utility functions. Decisions
to form or to sever links typically do not depend on absolute utility, but on marginal
changes in utility. Let mui (g, l) be the marginal utility of player i of deleting a set of links
l currently in network g, that is mui (g, l) := ui (g) − ui (g \ l) for (l ⊆ g). Equivalently, we
denote mui (g ∪ l, l) := ui (g ∪ l) − ui (g) as the marginal utility of adding the set of links l
to network g.
Each (exogenously given) triple (N, G, u) defines a situation of strategic network formation. From the vast literature of network formation, we employ two of the most
common stability notions.6 The first notion is based on a cooperative framework and
was introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Definition 1. A network g is pairwise stable (PS) if no link will be cut by a single player,
and no two players want to form a link:
(i) ∀ij ∈ g,

ui (g) ≥ ui(g\ij) and uj (g) ≥ uj (g\ij) and

(ii) ∀ij ∈
/ g,

ui (g ∪ ij) > ui (g) ⇒ uj (g ∪ ij) < uj (g).

This well-known definition captures the idea that links can be severed by any involved
player, whereas the formation of a link requires the consent of both players. Pairwise
stability is a basic notion that can be refined in multiple ways (e.g. unilateral stability,
6

A game theoretic foundation and a comparison of the three notions can be found in Bloch and Jackson
(2006).
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Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2005; strong stability, Jackson and Van de Nouweland, 2005;
or bilateral stability, Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007).7
The second notion of stability is based on the idea of transfers and can be found in Bloch
and Jackson (2007).
Definition 2. A network g is pairwise stable with transfers (PSt ) if there does not exist
any pair of players that can jointly benefit by adding, respectively cutting, their link:
(i) ∀ij ∈ g,
(ii) ∀ij ∈
/ g,

ui (g) + uj (g) ≥ ui (g \ ij) + uj (g \ ij) and
ui (g) + uj (g) ≥ ui (g ∪ ij) + uj (g ∪ ij).

We denote by [P S(u)], [P S t(u)] the sets of stable networks for a utility profile u.
While stability tries to answer which networks emerge based on individual preferences,
efficiency addresses the evaluation of networks from a societal point of view. To formally
capture efficiency, we use a welfare function w : Rn → R that typically (but not necessarily) is only dependent on the vector of utilities of all players, given a network g. Abusing
notation we will also write w(g) instead of w(u(g)). The most commonly used version of
a welfare function isP
the utilitarian welfare function, which simply sums up the utility of
u
all players, w (g) = i∈N ui(g). For some of our results, however, an even weaker way of
aggregating utility is sufficient. We only require a welfare function to satisfy monotonicity,
that is: ui (g) ≥ ui (g 0) ∀i ∈ N =⇒ w(u(g)) ≥ w(u(g 0)). This assumption is a very
intuitive and weak requirement for a welfare function. A welfare function should evaluate
a network g at least as high as a network g 0 if all players i ∈ N evaluate g at least as high
as g 0 .
Given a welfare function w, we can define efficiency:
Definition 3. A network g ∗ is called efficient with respect to the welfare function w if it
is a welfare maximizing network, that is w(g ∗) ≥ w(g) ∀g ∈ G.
In many network formation games we observe a general tension between stability and
efficiency.8 Individual interest often conflicts with social welfare. In the following we
want to ask under what conditions this tension is observed. Specifically, we ask whether
networks are “locally” efficient in a sense that neither links can be added nor severed to
increase overall welfare, and if not, we want to know how overall welfare can be improved.
We use the following two definitions in order to describe non-efficient networks.
Definition 4. A network g is called over-connected (with respect to the welfare function w) if ∃g 0 ⊂ g such that w(g 0) > w(g).
Definition 5. A network g is called under-connected (with respect to the welfare function w) if ∃g 0 ⊃ g such that w(g 0) > w(g).
7

Therefore, all results that we derive for all pairwise stable networks, e.g. non-efficiency of pairwise
stable networks, carry over to any stronger notion of stability.
8
See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for a general statement and Jackson (2004) for some more examples.
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A network is over-connected if it is “too dense” in the sense that overall welfare can be
improved by cutting links. Similarly, under-connected networks are “not dense enough”.
Efficient networks are neither over-connected nor under-connected, while all supernetworks of efficient networks are either over-connected or efficient and all subnetworks are
either under-connected or efficient. Note that for any given w, a network can satisfy
both, one, or none of these two properties. To shed some light into the tension between
stability and efficiency, we will ask whether and under what conditions stable networks
are over-connected or not under-connected, respectively under-connected or not overconnected. Our approach is very general and can be applied to most models of network
formation. We discuss the implications of our results for the tension between stability
and efficiency and also some of the implications for the characterization of stability and
efficiency. Furthermore, from the perspective of a social planner, this gives some insights
whether to subsidize or to tax the formation of links in order to arrive in a socially
preferred outcome.

3

Positive Externalities

We start by drawing our attention to network formation games with positive externalities.
Positive externalities in network formation games simply capture that two players forming
a link cannot decrease other players’ utilities. Differently put, players experience positive
effects on their utility from others forming a link. Defining it formally we get:
Definition 6. A profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities if ∀g ∈
G, ∀ij ∈
/ g, ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} it holds that
uk (g ∪ ij) ≥ uk (g).
Being required for any network, any link and any player, this property seems quite
restrictive. However, we argue that there are many such contexts, and we can easily
find examples in the literature on strategic network formation that satisfy this property.
Among them are “Provision of a pure public good” (Goyal and Joshi, 2006a), “Market sharing agreements” (Belleflamme and Bloch, 2004), and the “Connections model”
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), which we discuss below. In case of a utility function that
is additive separable into costs and benefits (where costs only depend on own degree),
positive externalities are implied by a simple monotonicity property of the benefit function.
In this context, players have to carry the costs of their own links, but share the benefits
with others. Intuitively, individual incentives to establish a link might be lower than its
collective value because of positive externalities.
Thus a link could be socially desirable, but conflicts with the individual interest of both
involved players. The other way around, however, is not possible: if two players agree
to form a link, then this link is always socially desirable because of positive externalities.
We need one additional property to strengthen this observation. Consider the following
definition (taken from Hellmann (2009)):
Definition 7. A profile of utility functions u is concave (in own links), if ∀i ∈ N, ∀g ∈
G, and ∀li ⊂ Li (g N \ g), ∀ij ∈ g it holds
mui (g, ij) ≥ mui (g ∪ li , ij).
6
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Informally put, the property requires that the marginal contribution of a link for a player is
decreasing in the set of links he already has. Hellmann (2009) shows that this concavity
property is equivalent to two notions we find in the literature. The first one is called
“convexity in own current links” (see e.g. Bloch and Jackson, 2007): A profile of utility
functions u P
is convex in own current links if ∀i ∈ N, ∀g ∈ G, and ∀l ⊆ Li (g) it holds that
mui (g, l) ≥ ij∈l mui (g, ij). The second property equivalent to concavity is known as “(1)concavity in own new links” (see Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç, 2007): A profile of utility
functions u is concave in own new links if for all i ∈ N, for all g ∈ G and
P for all links l such
N
that l ⊆ Li (g ), and l ∩ g = ∅ the following holds: mui (g ∪ l, l) ≥ ij∈l mui (g ∪ ij, ij).
We will use this equivalence in the proofs of Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3.
With these definitions in hand, we can now formalize the intuition that stable networks
are rather not dense enough compared to efficient networks. In fact, the following result
shows that a stable network can never be improved by the deletion of links.
Theorem 1. If a profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities and concavity,
then no pairwise stable network is over-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare
function w, that is ∀g ∈ [P S(u)] it holds that 6 ∃g 0 ⊂ g : w(g 0) > w(g).
All proofs can be found in the appendix. To prove this result, we show that any player is
worse off in a subnetwork g 0 of a PS network g.9 Pairwise stability together with concavity
implies that a player cannot prefer a network g̃(⊂ g) that has only been reduced by some
of his own links. Because of positive externalities, he cannot prefer a subnetwork g 0 ⊂ g̃
of the reduced network.
Positive externalities are one source for the inefficient outcome of under-connected networks. A second source can be the miscoordination between two players. Since pairwise
stability assumes that each link needs bilateral consent, it can happen that one player
i cuts a link (ij) although j would have heavily benefited from that link. Pairwise
stability with transfers excludes this source of inefficiency. While PS requires that no
agent improves his utility by cutting a link, pairwise stability with transfers is a bit
weaker in this respect (because the other player involved can compensate him for keeping
the link). To establish the corresponding result for pairwise stability with transfers, we
restrict attention to the utilitarian welfare function.
Theorem 2. If a profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities and concavity,
then no g ∈ [P S t (u)] is over-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
The assumptions on the utility function, namely positive externalities and concavity,
appear in many models of networks formation, some of which will be analyzed subsequently. There are models however that only fulfill the assumptions of the theorems for
a smaller domain of networks.10 For two networks g, g 0 ∈ G such that g ⊂ g 0 , let the
set [g, g 0] be defined as the set of all networks containing g and being contained in g 0 ,
[g, g 0] := {g 00 ∈ G|g ⊆ g 00 ⊆ g 0 }. When requiring the assumptions to hold only for a
smaller domain G̃ ⊂ G, with the additional assumption that [g ∅ , g] ⊆ G̃ for all g ∈ G̃, the
results carry over to that domain.
9

The result also implies that no subnetwork of a PS network is Pareto better, but is much stronger
than that.
10
In the case of negative externalities this is shown in the example of free trade agreements.
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Remark 1. Suppose u satisfies positive externalities and concavity in own links on a
domain G̃ ⊆ G, such that for all g ∈ G̃ it holds that [g ∅ , g] ⊆ G̃. Then no g ∈ G̃, which
is pairwise stable with transfers or pairwise stable is over-connected with respect to the
utilitarian welfare function.
The results excluding over-connectedness have trivial implications for the complete and
empty network. As any network is a subnetwork of the complete network, it follows that
(a) if the complete network is stable, then it must also be efficient. Since any network is
a supernetwork of the empty network it follows that, (b) if the empty network is uniquely
efficient, then no other network can be stable. Next, we study some models of network
formation from the literature and show how to apply our results.
The Connections Model Revisited
The connections model was introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It models the
flow of resources (like information or support) via shortest paths in a network. Let
dij (g) denote the distance of players i and j in network g (which is defined to be ∞ for
unconnected pairs), then the utility of each player can be written as
X
X
dij (g)
uCO
(g)
=
w
+
δ
w
−
cij , with δ ∈ (0, 1).
(1)
ii
ij
i
j:ij∈g

j6=i

It is easy to see that the connections model satisfies positive externalities. If ij forms
in some network g, then the utility of a player k 6= {i, j} either does not change or
increases as some of k’s distances are shortened because dkm(g ∪ ij) ≤ dkm (g) for all ij
and m. Moreover, it can be shown that that uCO (·) satisfies concavity. By the result of
Hellmann (2009) it suffices to show that uCO satisfies convexity P
in own current links, that
is ∀i ∈ N, ∀g ∈ G, and ∀l ⊆ Li (g), it holds that mui (g, l) ≥ ij∈l mui (g, ij). This has
been done by Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2007) for the symmetric connections model.
We make a straightforward generalization of their proof.11
Lemma 1. The heterogeneous connections model satisfies concavity.
Consequently (by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2), no pairwise (Nash) stable network can
be over-connected w.r.t any monotonic welfare function and no pairwise stable network
with transfers can be over-connected w.r.t. the utilitarian welfare function. While stable
networks depend on the dyadic specifications of value and costs (wij , cij ), the results
excluding over-connectedness imply that the welfare of a stable network can never be
improved by severing links.
There are more specific results for the connections model in its symmetric version, setting
wij = 1, cij = c (∀i 6= j) and considering the utilitarian welfare function w u only. This
has been studied in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Jackson (2003), Hummon (2000), and
Buechel (2008) among others. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, Prop. 1 and Prop. 2) show
11

In fact, such a generalization can be made for any distance-based utility function in the sense that
benefits are decreasing with distances and costs only depend on direct links.
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that for low costs (c < δ − δ 2 ) the complete network is efficient (and uniquely pairwise
δ 2 ) the star network is efficient; while for
stable); for medium costs (δ − δ 2 < c < δ + n−2
2
very high costs (c > δ + n−2
δ 2 ) the empty network is efficient. Their famous statement
2
of inefficiency in the connections model is the following: “For δ < c, any pairwise stable
network which is non-empty is such that each player has at least two links and thus is
inefficient.”12
What does our result excluding over-connectedness add to their discussion of inefficiency?
First, there is the above mentioned trivial implication for the empty network: Since any
network is a supernetwork of the empty network, it follows that if the empty network is
uniquely efficient, then no other network can be stable. Thus, the statement of inefficiency
is restricted to δ < c < δ + n−2
δ 2 . Second, the result on over-connectedness adds a new
2
point of view on the flavor of inefficiency. This can be illustrated in the following example,
which is also taken from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, Ex. 1).
1

2
11

3
8
10
6
7
9

5

4

Figure 1: Example of an inefficient network (“Tetrahedron”).
Example 1. The network in fig. 1, called “Tetrahedron”, is stable for costs c > δ, where
the star network is uniquely efficient.13 The tetrahedron is “too dense” in the sense that
it has 18 links, while the efficient network has 15. Accordingly, Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996, p. 51) label it as “over-connected”. However by Theorem 1, it is not overconnected according to the definition used in this paper. This means that the welfare of
the tetrahedron cannot be improved by leaving out some of its links. Moreover, we claim
that the tetrahedron is under-connected in the parameter range such that it is pairwise
stable. In the appendix we show that the addition of a link between the players “2” and
“6” would strictly improve utilitarian welfare. The same point as in the Tetrahedron can
be illustrated in a circle graph of n ≥ 7: both networks are under-connected for any costs
for which they are pairwise stable.
The example illustrates two different viewpoints on inefficiency (in the connections model).
From the viewpoint of a social planer that can unrestrictedly manipulate a given network,
some stable networks are “too dense” in the sense that less links are needed to form the
efficient one. From the viewpoint of a social planer who is restricted to either foster or
12

Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), p. 51.
More precisely, g T etra is pairwise stable iff δ − δ 5 + δ 2 − δ 4 + δ 2 − δ 5 + 2(δ 3 − δ 4 ) ≤ c ≤ δ − δ 8 + δ 2 −
7
δ + δ 3 − δ 6 + 2(δ 4 − δ 5 ).
13
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hinder the formation of links (e.g. by taxes or subsidies), many stable networks in the
connections model are “not dense enough” (under-connected), while none is “too dense”
(over-connected).

Market Sharing Agreements
Besides the connections model, it is easy to find further examples for positive externalities
(and concavity in own links). Among them is the model of “market sharing agreements”
described in Goyal and Joshi (2006a). In this model, there are n firms and n markets,
where each firm has one home market and can be active in all other markets, too. Before
starting a Cournot competition in each market, bilateral agreements can be made to stay
out of each other’s home market.
The reduction of competitors in the own market might be profitable. However, all
remaining competitors in the market benefit from these activities without paying for
it. That is why the utility function of this example exhibits positive externalities. In
addition, it satisfies concavity, such that both results above (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2)
apply. Consequently, positive externalities lead to rather too few agreements with respect
to a monotonic welfare function. Note that such a function only covers firms’ utility, but
not consumers’.

Provision of a Pure Public Good
Another example of a network formation model that satisfies the assumptions of Theorems
1 and 2 is the “provision of a pure public good” model by Goyal and Joshi (2006a)
who extended a model of Bloch (1997). In this model, n players
P choose an output
level xi (second stage), which is valuable for everybody π̃i (x) = i∈N xi . Collaboration
(knowledge sharing) between any two players is costly, but can reduce the marginal costs
of producing the output (first stage).14 Assuming that any player chooses his output
quantity optimally, the utility of a player i is:
X
1
uPi G (g) = (di(g) + 1)2 +
(dj (g) + 1)2 − cdi (g),
2
j∈N \i

where the first term is the difference of own output and production costs, the second term
is the output of all other agents, and the last term is the costs of collaboration.
Not surprisingly, the network formation situation of the first stage satisfies positive
externalities because other agents’ cooperations lower their costs, increase their optimal
xi
Agent i’s cost of producing the output is fi (xi , g) = 21 ( di (g)+1
)2 . Fixing the number of collaborators
P
di (g), the utility maximizing output quantity of an agent i can be derived by maxxi ∈R+ xi + j∈N \i xj −
xi
1
2
0
∗
2
2 ( di (g)+1 ) =: F (x). This yields F (x) = 0 ⇐⇒ xi = (di (g) + 1) . Then, plugging in the optimal output
∗
(F (x )) for any agent into the objective function and subtracting the linking costs yields the utility of
one agent.
14
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output and, hence, is beneficial to all. To see this, observe that the addition of foreign
links increases the middle term of the utility function. Note that in this example the
externalities are strict in the sense that the addition of any link in any network increases
the utility of all agents that are not involved. Moreover, given these specific functional
forms, u satisfies concavity. Thus, the two results (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) imply
again that no stable network can be over-connected.
Consider very low costs c ≤ 23 n2 − 32 (n−1)2 =: lb such that the complete network is stable.
By the results (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) above, the complete network must also be
efficient for these costs. In fact, since the externalities are strict, there exists an  > 0 such
that g N is efficient for c ≤ lb + . The tension can be illustrated for lb < c < lb + . In this
cost range the complete network would still be efficient. However, the stable networks are
not complete.
The model can be interpreted as a doubled public goods problem. In the second stage there
is the classic public goods problem, where individual output xi is chosen “too low” (from
a collective perspective). This problem persists, but in addition (in the first stage) players
tend to choose “too few” links reducing the cost of provision, such that the outcome is even
worse. In the same manner any network formation situation with positive externalities
can be interpreted as a public goods problem. Utility maximizing agents simply do not
internalize the positive effects that establishing a bilateral link means for other agents.

4

Negative Externalities

Negative externalities in network formation occur, when any addition of a link cannot be
beneficial for the players which are not involved in this link. Formally, we speak of weakly
negative externalities (further denoted as negative externalities) if the following holds:
Definition 8. A profile of utility functions u satisfies negative externalities if ∀g ∈
G, ∀ij ∈
/ g, ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} it holds that
uk (g ∪ ij) ≤ uk (g).
When considering negative externalities in economics, equilibrium analysis usually shows
that individuals do rather “too much” (pollute, etc.) than being socially optimal. In that
sense it is intuitive to think about “too dense” networks as being stable. For stability
only individual incentives are considered and not the overall welfare. Network formation
games with negative externalities are thus expected to be over-connected, and not underconnected. While the intuition points into the direction of rather “too dense” networks as
being stable, the bilateral nature of link formation does not necessarily exclude pairwise
stable networks from being under-connected. As discussed above any player has the
power to deny links.15 Although the concept of pairwise stability already solves some
miscoordination problems that arise in the bilateral network formation of the Myerson
game, it might happen that a player rejects a link that is highly beneficial to the proposing
15

In section 5 when introducing a general framework that is not restricted to bilateral and unweighted
network formation we treat this as a property of the outcome function, which we call rejection power.
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player. This link, however, could potentially lead to higher welfare, which we aim to
exclude.
A simple way out of this issue is using the stability concept “Pairwise Stability with
transfers” [P S t ]. This concept helps ensure that any single link that is not in a network
g, which is pairwise stable with transfers, cannot be welfare improving. Analogously to
our results on positive externalities, we require concavity (see Definition 7) for our main
result on negative externalities to ensure that no set of links can be welfare improving.
Utility functions satisfying this property imply that networks, which are pairwise stable
with transfers are not under-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function:
Theorem 3. Suppose a profile of utility functions u satisfies negative externalities and
concavity, then no network g ∈ G, which is pairwise stable with transfers, is underconnected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
As usual the proof can be found in the appendix. Pairwise stability with transfers differs
from pairwise stability significantly. In general, neither [P S(u)] ⊆ [P S t (u)] nor [P S(u)] ⊇
[P S t (u)]. The concept of pairwise stability with transfers rather stems from a game, in
which players can pay transfers to make others willing to build a link. Formally, pairwise
stability with transfers has been introduced in Bloch and Jackson (2007). Although the
concepts differ, we can easily find properties of the utility function that are sufficient to
ensure equivalence of both stability concepts. Intuitively, both concepts should coincide
if for any link the gains or losses for both involved individuals coincide. This is the case
in network formation games that have potential function.16 The property that we need
in order to show equivalence of the concepts, however, only requires individuals to either
both gain or lose from a link. The following definition taken from Chakrabarti and Gilles
(2007) formalizes this intuition:
Definition 9. A profile of utility functions u satisfies pairwise sign compatibility (PSC),
if for all g ∈ G and for all links ij ∈ g it holds, that:
sgn (mui (g, ij)) = sgn (muj (g, ij))
Pairwise sign compatibility requires any two players to either both gain, both lose or
both be indifferent from a mutual link in any network. Under this condition the power
to deny any link does not play a role, since any rational denial of a link by one player
implies that the link is not beneficial for both involved players. In particular no transfer
of utility would make sense in a network, that is already pairwise stable, and conversely if
no transfer for any link is beneficial, then no addition or deletion of a link is beneficial for
either player, meaning that the network is pairwise stable. Thus, both stability concepts
coincide and we get:
Theorem 4. Suppose that a profile of utility functions satisfies PSC. Then,
[P S(u)] = [P S t (u)].
As a consequence of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 it is obvious that under PSC, concavity
and negative externalities, no pairwise stable network can be under-connected.
16

For a study of network potentials, see Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007).
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Corollary 1. Suppose that a profile of utility functions satisfies negative externalities,
PSC and concavity in own links. Then, no network g which is pairwise stable is underconnected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
The proof is an immediate implication of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 and thus is omitted.
For both results we can restrict the domain of networks for which the assumptions have
to hold resembling Remark 1.
Remark 2. Suppose u satisfies negative externalities and concavity on a domain G̃ ⊆ G,
such that for all g ∈ G̃ it holds that [g, g N ] ⊆ G̃. Then no g ∈ G̃, which is pairwise
stable with transfers is under-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
If u additionally satisfies P SC on g̃, then no pairwise stable network is under-connected
with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
The remark is shown in the appendix. It becomes very handy when analyzing network
formation games that fulfill the properties of Theorem 3 only on a certain domain G̃. We
will see examples of network formation games such that the utility function is concave
only for networks such that all players have at least one link,17 and it is straightforward
to see that for such a set of networks Ḡ := {g ∈ G|di (g) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ N} it holds that
g ∈ Ḡ ⇒ [g, g N ] ⊆ Ḡ. Another example of a domain of networks for which the above
property is satisfied is the set of connected networks.18
We require pairwise stability with transfers or the pairwise sign compatibility for our
result, since it is a way to limit the gain of one of the two players from a potential mutual
link. Without assuming pairwise sign compatibility or transfers, we need to compare the
sum of utilities of non-involved players to the sum of utilities of involved players for any
new link to exclude large gains and thus stable networks from being under-connected. If
we cannot exclude possible gains from additional links in pairwise stable networks, we
may, however, ask whether a pairwise stable network is not Pareto under-connected, that
is whether there does not exists a Pareto better supernetwork.
Definition 10. A network g ∈ G is Pareto under-connected if there exists a network
g 0 ⊃ g, such that ui (g 0) ≥ ui (g) for all i ∈ N, and there exists a j ∈ N such that
uj (g 0) > uj (g).
To exclude Pareto under-connectedness, the following definition of transitivity is needed:
Definition 11. A utility function satisfies transitivity of negative (positive) marginal
utility in new links for g ∈ G if for all ij, jk ∈
/ g the following holds:
mui (g, ij) < (>)0, muj (g, jk) < (>)0

⇒

mui (g, ik) < (>)0.

This definition captures the idea of transitivity: if player A does not want to connect
to B and B does not want to connect to C, then A does not want to connect to C.
The following Theorem presents the result that no pairwise stable network can be Pareto
under-connected.
17

The model of free-trade agreements satisfies concavity only for networks such each players degree is
at least one.
18
The set of connected networks is formally defined as Gcon := {g ∈ G | ∀i, j ∈ N, dij (g) < ∞}.
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Theorem 5. Suppose a profile of utility functions satisfies negative externalities, and
concavity. If g is pairwise stable and u satisfies transitivity of negative marginal utility
for g, then g cannot be Pareto under-connected.
In the proof of the result, we need the transitivity property in order to exclude the case
that a set of links l can be added to a pairwise stable network such that each involved
individual has at least two links in l. This set of links can be potentially beneficial, if
for each player one link is highly beneficial (and thus a loss for the other players) and
compensates for the loss of other links (which could mean gains for the other players,
which are involved). The property of transitivity, however, is only needed locally, that is
it is only needed for pairwise stable networks. It could thus also be seen as a stability
refinement.

Degree Dependent Utility Functions
A lot of applications and examples of network formation games with negative externalities
can be found under what we call “degree dependent utility functions”. For instance, Goyal
and Joshi (2006a) present network formation models, where the utility functions depend
only on the number of own links, the number of links of neighbors and on the number of
links of non-neighbors. They analyze two different models:
• Playing the field:
• Local Spillovers:


uPi F (g) = Φ di(g), D(g−i) − di (g)c.

uLS
i (g) = Ψ1 (di (g)) +

X

j∈Ni

Ψ2 (dj (g)) +

X

Ψ3 (dk (g)).

(2)

(3)

k ∈N
/ i

Here g−iPrepresents the network, obtained by deleting player i and all his links and
D(g) = i∈N di (g). The first utility function, playing the field, presented by Goyal and
Joshi (2006a) features a very specific structure in that each utility does not depend on
network positions, but rather on the number of own and the sum of all other players’ links.
In contrast, the local spillover utility function includes a little bit more of the network
structure. Here, neighborhood distribution of links matters. In the playing the field case,
players do not care to whom to connect, they are not able to distinguish between different
players, whereas in the local spillover case, players are able to distinguish between players
and might have preferences of whom to connect to. For the following we will generalize
both cases and try to shed some light on the tension between stability and efficiency when
considering the following utility function:
Definition 12. A profile of utility functions is called homogeneous degree dependent utility
function if for all i ∈ N there exist function f : Rn → R such that:




uDD
(g)
:=
f
d
(g),
d
(g)
,
d
(g)
.
(4)
i
j
k
i
j∈Ni (g)
k ∈N
/ i (g)
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This utility function captures both the local spillovers function and the playing the field
function, as well as other examples. The distinction between neighbors and non-neighbors
is only made for illustration since in a lot of examples those degrees
are treated differently.

DD
DD
Abusing notation, we will also write ui di , (dj )j∈Ni , (dk )k∈N
/ i instead of ui (g).

For the analysis of both playing the field and general degree dependent utility functions,
we focus on the case of negative externalities, since the tension between efficiency and
pairwise stability seems to be sufficiently covered in section 3. In contrast the case of
negative externalities requires the properties transfers or pairwise sign compatibility in
order to show the result.
In the playing the field case, negative externalities imply that uP F is decreasing in its
second argument, i.e. uP F (l, k+1)−uP F (l, k) ≤ 0 for all l = {0, ..., n−1}, k = {0, ..., n−2}.
General degree dependent utility functions satisfy negative externalities if for all i ∈ N,
for all di ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, and for all d−i , d˜−i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}n−1 such that d˜k ≥ dk for all
k ∈ N \ {i}, the following holds:
DD
uDD
(di, d˜−i ).
i (di , d−i ) ≥ ui

For the special cases of degree dependent utility functions, the results of section 4 carry
over and some assumptions are automatically satisfied. For playing the field utility functions, it becomes immediately clear from (2), that uP F satisfies our notion of transitivity
for all g ∈ G because either a player wants a link to any remaining player or to none. Thus
the transitivity condition of Theorem 5 is satisfied, and we get the following corollary :
Corollary 2. Suppose that the profile of utility functions of a network formation game
is given by (2), and uP F satisfies negative externalities and concavity. Then no pairwise
stable network g is Pareto under-connected.
Due to the special structure and homogeneity of the utility functions given by (2) and (3),
it is often observed that regular networks are pairwise stable, i.e. feature equal degree
distributions.19 Since the utility functions given by (4) are homogeneous, regular pairwise
stable networks are also pairwise stable with transfers. This is true since no single player
wants to add or cut a link in regular pairwise stable networks. Furthermore, the star is
a common observed stable network. In the star, n − 1 players share equal degree, and
the other player is completely connected, and cannot add any links. Thus, the same
considerations hold for the star. These observations lead to the following result:
Corollary 3. Suppose that the profile of utility functions is given by (4) and, furthermore,
satisfies negative externalities and concavity. Then, no regular pairwise stable network is
under-connected. Moreover if the star is pairwise stable, then it is not under-connected.
The corollary also holds for playing the field and local spillover utility functions since
degree based utility functions satisfying (4) contain these two cases.
Applications of degree dependent utility functions can be found plenty. Among those are
the provision of a public good and the market sharing agreements presented in section 3,
19

See Goyal and Joshi (2006a) for a detailed analysis of stable networks in playing the field and local
spillover games.
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but also there are several examples for negative externalities, of which we present some
below.

The Co-author Model
The co-author model has been introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in their seminal
paper and describes the utility of joint work. The nodes of the network are interpreted
as researchers, who spend time writing papers. A link between two researchers i and j
represents a collaboration between both researchers. The amount of time a researcher
spends on a project is inversely related to the number of projects he is involved in. The
payoff function is given by:
uCA
i (g)



 X
X  1
1
1
1
1
=
+
+
=1+ 1+
,
di (g) dj (g) di (g)dj (g)
di (g)
dj (g)
j∈Ni (g)

k∈Ni (g)

and uCA
i (g) = 0 if di = 0. The utility depends only on own degree and neighbors
degree and thus is degree dependent. Obviously, the functional form satisfies negative
externalities as the utility of players decrease, when neighbors are adding links, i.e.
increasing their degree. From Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we get that if n is even,
then any efficient network consists of n/2 separate pairs. Any pairwise stable network,
however, can be partitioned into fully intra-connected components, each of which has a
different number of members (if m is the number of members of one such component and
k is the next largest size, then m > k 2 ).
We can add to this result that none of the stable networks contains a singleton component
since each player is better off connecting to some player than to none, and each player i
wants a link to a player j, for whom dj ≤ di. For n being even it is clear, that any pairwise
stable network contains an efficient network, since any network consisting of n/2 separate
pairs is efficient. For n being odd, any network that consists of (n − 2)/2 separate pairs
and three players, which are connected by 2 links, is efficient. We can show that also in
the case of n being odd that any pairwise stable network contains an efficient network,
implying over-connected pairwise stable network.
Proposition 1. In the co-author model if n ≥ 3, then any pairwise stable network is
over-connected.
The proof is straightforward and uses the result of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) componentwise (for any completely connected component of the pairwise stable networks). It is
welfare better for any component of at least size three to be connected like one of the
efficient networks. Thus any component of any pairwise stable network contains a welfare
better subcomponent, implying that any pairwise stable network contains a welfare better
subnetwork.
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Patent Races
Goyal and Joshi (2006a) derive this model as a variation of the classical patent race
model.20 In addition to the classical model, firms can join R&D collaborations to accelerate research. The first firm to develop the new product is awarded a patent. The random
time τ (li (g)) at which the innovation happens is given by
P r({τ (di(g)) ≤ t}) = 1 − exp(−di (g)t).
Assuming risk neutrality, payoff of 1 in case of receiving the patent and 0 else, and a
discount factor ρ, a firm i gets the following expected payoff:

uPi R di (g), D(g−i) = Et [exp(−ρt)P r(τ (di (g)) = t) Π P r(τ (dj (g)) > t)] − di (g)c
j6=i

=

di(g)
di (g)
− di(g)c =
− di (g)c.
ρ + D(g)
ρ + 2di(g) + D(g−i)

This model is thus a playing the field utility function. Moreover, it satisfies negative
externalities since links of other firms reduce the probability to innovate firstly. Also,
since uPi R is a concave function of di (g), it is concave according to Definition 7. From
Theorem 3 we can thus conclude that no pairwise stable network with transfers is underconnected. In fact, it is straightforward to calculate the efficient networks since the
utilitarian welfare is given by:

X
X  di (g)
D(g)
PR
PR
w (g) =
ui (g) =
− di (g)c =
− D(g)c.
ρ
+
D(g)
ρ
+
D(g)
i∈N
i∈N
In this case the utilitarian welfare only depends on the total number of links and thus
any network that contains the optimal number of total links is efficient. The distribution
of links and the structure of the network do not matter for efficiency. We can easily
ρ
ρ
calculate that for (ρ+2(k+1))(ρ+2k)
< c < (ρ+2k)(ρ+2(k−1))
any network which contains k links
is efficient and no other networks are efficient.
It requires a little bit more to characterize stable networks. However, for this matter we
can apply Theorem 3 in order to bound the total number of links.
ρ
Proposition 2. Suppose that (ρ+2k+2)(ρ+2k)
< c, then all networks g, which are pairwise
stable with transfers, have to contain more than k total links, in other words D(g) ≥ 2k.

In their paper, Goyal and Joshi (2006a) only find a partial characterization for the set
of pairwise stable networks. By applying Theorem 3 we were able to contribute to their
characterization. This example shows that Theorem 3 not only describes the tension
between stability and efficiency, but it can also be applied to characterize the stable
networks (resp. the efficient ones).
20

See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) among others.
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Free Trade Agreements
This model has been introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006b). We analyze the most basic
setup here. In this example there are n countries. In each country there is one firm
producing a homogeneous good. The firm may sell the product in the domestic market
as well as in foreign markets. If two countries do not have a free trade agreement (FTA)
the importing country charges tariffs. Given a configuration of FTA’s the firms then
compete in each market by choosing quantities. We denote the quantity output of firm
j in country i by Qji . In each country
P i ∈ N, a firm faces an identical inverse demand
given by Pi = α − Qi , where Qi = j∈N Qji , and α > 0. All firms have a constant and
identical marginal cost of production, α > γ > 0. In the basic model, linear demand and
identical tariffs are assumed. Forming an FTA lowers the tariff to 0. Assuming high tariffs
T > α, firm i sells in country j if and only if there is a FTA between the two countries,
.
i.e. ij ∈ g. Given firm i is active in market j, then its output is given by Qij = djα−γ
(g)+1
The utility function of country i is given by its “social welfare” derived as the sum of
consumer surplus, firm’s profits and tariff revenue, which can be simplified in our basic
setup:
X
 X j
uFi T A(g) = 1/2Q2i + (Pi (g) − γ)Qii (g) +
(Pj (g) − γ − Tji (g))Qij (g) +
Ti (g)Qji (g)
j6=i

= 1/2



(α − γ)(di (g) + 1)
di (g) + 2

2

j6=i

X

+

j∈(Ni (g)∪{i})



α−γ
dj (g) + 2

2

.

Again, this utility function is degree dependent. Moreover, it is straightforward to see
that uF T A satisfies negative externalities. To see the reasoning for negative externalities,
suppose a free trade partner j of country i signs a free trade agreement with country
k. Then firm k will enter market j and thus reduces the Cournot output of firm i,
lowering the country’s welfare function. If two non-trade partners of i sign a free trade
agreement, then i’s payoff remains unaffected. Straightforward calculations show that
uFi T A satisfies concavity whenever di ≥ 1. From Goyal and Joshi (2006b) we get the
following characterization of stability and efficiency:
Proposition 3. (Goyal and Joshi, 2006b) The complete network is a stable trading
network. Furthermore, a network such that one component has n − 1 countries and is
complete and the other component is a single country can be stable. However, the complete
network is uniquely efficient.
In this case, the network such that there is one component with n − 1 countries and
one unconnected country is under-connected. It can be shown, that this network is also
pairwise stable with transfers if n is sufficiently large. These networks however, do not
fall in the restricted domain in Remark 2 since concavity only holds for uFi T A if di ≥ 1.
Thus Remark 2 only applies to all g ∈ G̃ such that G̃ := {g ∈ G | di (g) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ N},
and hence does not exclude the case of under-connected pairwise stable networks g ∈
/ G̃.

18
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper299

18

Hellmann and Buechel: Under-connected and Over-connected Networks

5

Extensions

So far, we have only considered undirected and unweighted networks. In this section we
relax those assumptions by providing a general framework for the formation of networks
and generalizing our main results. Particularly, our framework captures models of directed
network formation including those in Bala and Goyal (2000) and models of weighted
network formation of Bloch and Dutta (2005) and Rogers (2006). We show in this very
general setup that we are able to reestablish the results discussed above. Moreover, by
considering Nash stable networks, the statements get stronger.

5.1

Framework

As before, let N be a set of agents. In the following we define a network g to be a
n × n-matrix [gij ]i,j∈N , where an entry gij ∈ R is the weight of the relation from agent i
to agent j. In the context of directed networks gij stands for the intensity/strength of the
~ which is different from the link ji.
~ In the context of undirected networks gij = gji
link ij
is interpreted as the intensity of the link ij. Unweighted networks are represented by
gij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N, where the intensity 0 or 1 indicates whether a link is present.
A loop (or self-link) gii 6= 0 may stand for the resources (e.g. time, money) devoted to
oneself. A negative tie gij < 0 incorporates a negative relation, such as being enemies.
Let G := {[gij ]i,j∈N |gij ∈ R} be the set of all n × n-matrices. We will restrict this domain
according to the application in mind. For example G, the set of networks we considered
in the sections above, can be written as a subset of G.21 Each player has a preference
ordering over the set of networks, which we represent by a utility function ui : G → R.
Let us now generalize Myerson’s link announcement game.
A Generalized Link Announcement Game
Consider the following game form (N, S, Ψ) where N is the set of players as above, Si := Rn
is player i’s strategy set and Ψ : S → G is an outcome rule mapping strategy profiles
into networks. The strategy set of each player is interpreted as intensities that a player
can announce for the relationship with another player. We will also sometimes refer to
strategies as an effort that player i invests into the relationship with j. The outcome
rule Ψ defines how individual strategies translate into network links. In virtually any
model, the intensity gij is only dependent on sij and sji and it does not decrease, ceteris
paribus, with an increase in one of those. Therefore, we will assume for the following that
Ψ is fully described by a function ψ that translates individual efforts into link strengths,
gij = ψ(sij , sji ), where ψ is non-decreasing function in both arguments.22
Consider the following examples of outcome rules, which lead to a reformulation of well21

In particular, G = {g ∈ G : gii = 0, ∀i ∈ N ; gij = gji ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ N } is the set of undirected
unweighted networks without loops.
22
This assumption restricts outcome rules such that the intensity gij cannot be determined by the
strategy of some player k 6∈ {i, j}. Of course, that does not hinder agents from interacting strategically.
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known models from the literature:
(
1 if i 6= j and min{sij , sji } ≥ 1
I) gij = ψ(sij , sji ) =
. Since link strength is either
0 else
0 or 1, this models the formation of unweighted networks. Moreover, networks
are undirected because ψ(sij , sji) = ψ(sji , sij ). Finally, the networks may not
exhibit loops because gii = 0 ∀i ∈ N. Thus, we are in the context of unweighted
undirected networks without loops. In fact, this is a reformulation of Myerson’s link
announcement game, also called the Consent Game. Strategies in this model are
simply interpreted as players announcing the links they desire, i.e. sij ≥ 1, while
links are only formed if the two involved players agree about it.
II) gij = ψ(sij , sji ) = φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) ∈ [0, 1]. This outcome rule allows to form
undirected networks with link intensities in the interval [0, 1]. Individual efforts
are perfect substitutes. Such a model for the formation of undirected weighted
networks can be found in Bloch and Dutta (2005) (see “Assumption 1”).
III) gij = ψ(sij , sji) = φ(min{sij , sji}) ∈ [0, 1]. This outcome rule captures the second
model of Bloch and Dutta (2005) (see “Assumption 2”). It models the formation of
undirected weighted networks, where individual efforts are perfect complements.
(
1 if i 6= j and sij ≥ 1
IV) gij = ψ(sij , sji) =
. With this outcome rule link strength
0 else
can only be 0 or 1, modeling the formation of an unweighted network. Moreover, gij
need not be equal to gji such that the networks are directed. The models in Bala
and Goyal (2000) belong to this class.23
V) gij = ψ(sij , sji) = φ(sij ) ∈ R+ .24 This outcome rule models the formation of undirected networks which are weighted. Here, the intensity of any link is determined by
the strategy of a single player. Specifically, any player can determine his outgoing
links. A model of this type can be found in Rogers (2006) (see “Model A”).
VI) gij = ψ(sij , sji) = φ(sji) ∈ R+ . This outcome rule captures the second model
of Rogers (2006) (see “Model G”). It models the formation of directed weighted
networks, where any player can determine his incoming links.
As the examples show, a choice of outcome rule determines the set of feasible networks
in a model, GΨ := {g ∈ G|∃s ∈ S : Ψ(s) = g}. This completes the generalized
society (N, GΨ , u). The six examples of outcome rules incorporate models of weighted
and unweighted, directed and undirected networks, but do not cover loops or negative
links. Such models, although reasonable, can hardly be found in the literature. To
complete the definition of a non-cooperative game Γ = (N, S, uΨ ), we assume that the
payoffs uΨ : S → Rn are defined by the network utility function function u evaluating the
induced network, uΨ (s) := u(Ψ(s)).
23

Not only the one-way flow model, but also the two-way flow model is formalized as a directed network
here because the utility of an agent does not only depend on the undirected links established, but also
on who initiated them.
24
Here φ may be specified according to the application in mind.
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Now, we can make use of the well-established solution concepts for non-cooperative games.
As usual, we define: s∗ is a Nash Equilibrium in Γ if ∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ Si it holds that
∗
∗
Ψ ∗
uΨ
i (s−i , si ) ≥ ui (s−i , si ). This leads to a basic notion of stability for a generalized society
(N, GΨ , u).
Definition 13. A network g is Nash stable (NS) if it can be supported by a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding link formation game Γ; formally, g ∈ [NS(u)] if and only if
∃s ∈ S such that s is a Nash equilibrium in Γ and Ψ(s) = g.
Several other notions of stability are reasonable. In particular, Nash stability is too weak
for a reasonable stability concept in the Consent Game (outcome rule I) because, due to
coordination problems, any network where no player wants to cut links is Nash stable.
But, since the notion of Nash equilibrium is so weak, the results we present for Nash
stable networks are strong as they hold for any refinement of Nash stability.
Note that the way we represent the examples of models above is not identical to their
introduction in the literature. We embedded them into our framework without keeping
the original notation and in the various models φ is further specified, e.g. to be concave,
convex, satisfy φ(0) = 0, etc. More importantly, we work with the strategy sets of the
form Si = RN in any model. While this might lead to much more Nash equilibria in the
space of strategy profiles, it does not lead to more Nash stable networks in the outcome
space. For instance, in the original formulation of the Consent Game, strategy sets are
{0, 1}, while in our formulation (outcome rule I) a player can announce any real number
above 1 to initiate a link. However, the outcome rule is specified such that the set of
networks GΨ is identical to the set of possible networks of the Consent Game in Myerson
(1991), which we denoted by G in the former sections. Moreover, in the models of Rogers
(2006) and Bloch and Dutta (2005) strategies are restricted.P
For example, Rogers (2006)
introduces a budget constraint βi for every agent such that j∈N sij ≤ βi , while sii = 0.
Similar assumptions are made in Bloch and Dutta (2005). We will address this aspect
below.
Some notation for a Generalized Situation of Network Formation
Consider a generalized society (N, GΨ , u). For GΨ , the set of feasible networks depending
on the outcome rule Ψ, we can define similar operations as in Section 2. We call a matrix
g 0 a subnetwork (supernetwork) of a network g(∈ GΨ ), denoted as g 0 < (=)g, if it belongs
to the set of feasible networks g 0 ∈ GΨ and all entries in the matrix are smaller (larger)
or equal, gij0 ≤ (≥)gij , ∀i, j ∈ N. Similarly, we denote g 0 <i g if g is a subnetwork of g 0
0
that differs only in links involving i, i.e. g 0 <i g if and only if g 0 < g and gkl
< gkl implies
that i ∈ {k, l}.
In a given network, players may increase or decrease intensities of links. We use the
0
]k,l∈N with
following notation: For g ∈ GΨ and δ ∈ R we denote by g +ij δ the matrix [gkl
0
0
~
gkl = gkl ∀(k, l) 6= (i, j) and gij = gij + δ, which means that the intensity of the link ij
is increased by δ. This definition is only meaningful if the operation gij + δ is feasible,
that is if g 0 ∈ GΨ .25 In the context of undirected networks, each change of link strength
25

For instance, Ψ has to present an outcome rule that allows for directed networks.
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has consequences for two entries in the matrix which defines the network. Therefore, we
define the following operation: For g ∈ GΨ and δ ∈ R we denote by g ∓ij δ the matrix
0
0
0
[gkl
]k,l∈N with gkl
= gkl ∀{k, l} =
6 {i, j} and gij0 = gij + δ and gji
= gji + δ, which means
that the intensity of link ij is increased by δ. Both operations coincide for changes of
loop intensities, i.e. g +ii δ = g ∓ii δ.
The definitions of efficiency in Section 2 carry over from a society (N, G, u) to a generalized
society (N, GΨ , u), only the domain has to be adapted. In brief, a welfare function w :
Rn → R satisfies monotonicity if ui (g) ≥ ui (g 0) ∀i ∈ N =⇒ w(u(g)) ≥ w(u(g 0)).
Moreover, a network g is called over-connected (under-connected) with respect to the
welfare function w if ∃g 0 < (=)g such that w(u(g 0)) > w(u(g)).
To organize our discussion of the general model, we distinguish between unilateral and
bilateral network formation. Network formation is bilateral if a link gij is determined
by both agent i and agent j. Network formation is unilateral if an agent is in control
of “his” links. Considering the examples of outcome rules above, examples I,II, and III
incorporate bilateral network formation, while outcome rules IV, V, and VI incorporate
unilateral network formation. In principle it is also possible to have a model with bilateral
formation of directed links.26 However, we do not consider this unnatural case in the next
two subsections.

5.2

Bilateral Network Formation

In this section we focus entirely on the bilateral formation of undirected networks. Thus,
a link ij is described by its strength gij = gji, which is jointly determined by the players i
and j, ψ(sij , sji) = gij = gji. Considering the examples of outcome rules above, examples
I, II, and III belong to this class of models. In fact, all models we discuss in Section 3 and
4, are examples for bilateral network formation and can be formulated as a Consent Game
(outcome rule I). Consistently, the notions of stability we use there, i.e. pairwise stability
and pairwise stability with transfers, incorporate bilateral network formation. Now, we
want to extend those results to the framework that allows for weighted links, loops and
negative links, in addition. For this purpose, let us rewrite the definitions of externalities
(Definition 6 and 8):
Definition 14. A profile of utility functions u satisfies positive (negative) externalities in
bilateral network formation if ∀g ∈ GΨ , ∀i, j ∈ N, ∀δ > 0 : g∓ij δ ∈ GΨ and ∀k ∈ N \{i, j}
it holds that
uk (g ∓ij δ) ≥ (≤)uk (g).
In words: If agents i and j increase the intensity of their link (gij and gji), then a player
k not involved in this link does not loose (gain) utility. In bilateral network formation
players usually have the power to deny links. This is a basic idea in the notion of pairwise
stability and it is also true for models based on the outcome rules I and III above. Let us
formally define this property:
Definition 15. An outcome rule Ψ satisfies rejection power if ∀g, g 0 ∈ GΨ : g 0 <i g , it
holds that ∀s ∈ Ψ−1 (g), there exists s0i ∈ Si such that Ψ(s−i , s0i ) = g 0 .
26

Note that an outcome rule allowing for a domain of only undirected links cannot be unilateral.

22
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper299

22

Hellmann and Buechel: Under-connected and Over-connected Networks

In words: Given a network and a subnetwork that only differ in the intensity of links
involving agent i, for any strategy profile inducing the first network, i is able to deviate in
order to reach the latter. Simply put, player i is able to deny any intensity that another
player proposes toward him.27 Theorem 1 makes a statement about the bilateral formation
of unweighted networks, when positive externalities are satisfied, using the requirement of
pairwise stability. With the property of rejection power, we are able to restate this result
for general situations of bilateral network formation:
Theorem 6. Let an outcome rule Ψ satisfy rejection power. If a profile of utility functions u satisfies positive externalities in bilateral network formation, then no Nash stable
network g ∈ GΨ is over-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare function w.
Thus reducing the intensity of any set of links in a Nash stable network does not increase
the utility of any player. In the special case of unweighted networks (without loops),
Theorem 6 has the same implications as Theorem 1 does. In contrast to Theorem 1,
it does not need the concavity assumption, but makes a statement about Nash stability
instead of pairwise stability. The two concepts do not stand in a simple relation – in
general neither [NS(u)] ⊆ [P S(u)] nor [P S(u)] ⊆ [NS(u)] holds. More precisely, the
property of concavity we need for Theorem 1 is sufficient for [P S(u)] ⊆ [NS(u)] (as
shown in Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç, 2007). Both notions share many refinements. One
prominent example is the concept of pairwise Nash stability (PNS), also called pairwise
equilibrium (Goyal and Joshi, 2006a), which simply incorporates the properties of both
Nash equilibrium and pairwise stable networks, [P NS(u)] := [NS(u)] ∩ [P S(u)] (see, e.g.,
Bloch and Jackson, 2006). Since pairwise Nash stability is a refinement of Nash stability,
we get a direct corollary: If the conditions of Theorem 6 are met, then no pairwise Nash
stable network is over-connected w.r.t. any monotonic welfare function.
In Section 3 we presented several examples of unweighted network formation where the
results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 6 apply. Besides the examples of unweighted networks,
the models of Bloch and Dutta (2005) using outcome rule III satisfy rejection power and
positive externalities. The fact that they formulate their model with a budget constraint
does not contradict the property of rejection power that we need. Thus, Theorem 6 does
apply. However, in this specific example it is not surprising that no Nash stable network
can be socially improved by the addition of links because the utility functions are such
that no network can be improved by the deletion of links, ceteris paribus. The focus of
this model – the allocation of effort between different links facing a budget constraint – is
not addressed by our result. However, Bloch and Dutta (2005) mention that an interesting
variation of their model would be to replace budget constraints by linking costs. Then the
individual decisions are not restricted to the allocation of link intensity, but also determine
the total amount of link intensity. For such a model our result implies that agents rather
under-invest, but surely never over-invest in link intensities due to positive externalities.
A corresponding result to Theorem 6 can be formulated for negative externalities if an
outcome rule satisfies some other type of power. Specifically, we need the property that
any player can add intensity to any of his links, despite the action of the other player
27

This property is the special feature of the Consent Game, where both players have to propose a link
to have it formed. Similarly, outcome rule III taken from Bloch and Dutta (2005) is based on the minimal
intensities announced such that rejection power is satisfied.
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involved (the power to form links at free will). One example would be an outcome rule
that is based on the maximal effort gij = ψ(sij , sji) = max{sij , sji }. However, it is not
clear in which settings this would be a natural assumption.

5.3

Unilateral Network Formation

Any result so far has concerned undirected links. We finish this paper with a short analysis
of the unilateral formation of directed links. Typically, in the formation of directed
networks (weighted or unweighted) it is a reasonable assumption that each player is in
~ with strength gij is determined by player i,
control of his outgoing links, thus a link ij
gij = ψ(sij ).
Among the outcome rules we mentioned, rules IV and V belong to this setting. Outcome
rule VI is a special case of unilateral network formation, where agents are in control of
their incoming links. Such a model can be easily rewritten to fit into this subsection by
changing the role of outgoing and incoming links in the utility function.
Since unilateral network formation does not need any input from the player to whom the
link is formed, it is reasonable to reformulate the notion of externalities.
Definition 16. A profile of utility functions u satisfies positive (negative) externalities
in unilateral network formation, if ∀g ∈ GΨ , ∀(i, j) ∈ N × N, ∀δ > 0 : g +ij δ ∈ GΨ and
∀k ∈ N \ {i}, it holds that
uk (g +ij δ) ≥ (≤)uk (g).
In words, positive externalities mean that if a player increases the intensity of one of
his outgoing links, then no other player’s utility decreases. Here externalities include
the player for whom the incoming link has changed, except if the intensity of a loop
is changed (g +ii δ). Nash stability is a concept of unilateral deviations. In models of
unilateral network formation, we do not need further assumptions to generally characterize
the relation between Nash stability and efficiency of directed networks.
Theorem 7. Let an outcome rule be unilateral gij = ψ(sij ). If a profile of utility functions
u satisfies positive (negative) externalities in unilateral network formation, then no Nash
stable network is over-connected (under-connected) with respect to any monotonic welfare
function w.
In words: Given a Nash stable network g. In any subnetwork g 0 < g, any player is weakly
worse off, ui(g 0 ) ≤ ui(g).
Consider first the model “A” by Rogers
P (2006), i.e. outcome rule V. He uses a utility
function of the type ui (g) = αi + j∈N (αj + vj ) ∗ gij , where each player’s utility is
recursively defined as the sum of an intrinsic value αi and the value derived from other
agents vi , which is again a sum of intrinsic value and derived value. In this model there
is no tension between stability and efficiency. As Jackson (2008) points out, this relies
on several assumptions. Most importantly, Rogers (2006) works with a budget constraint
restricting the players choices of how much intensity to “invest” in social relationships.
Thus, the efficiency result tells us that the decisions about the allocation of link intensities
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are efficient. This need not be true for decisions about the amount of intensities if we
allow players to decide upon them. Therefore, as in the model of Bloch and Dutta (2005),
an interesting variation of Roger’s model would be to incorporate linking costs instead of
capacity constraints. In such a model, positive externalities are still satisfied since linking
costs are internalized. Thus, Theorem 7 implies the inefficient outcomes of such a model
are improvable by increasing the intensity of some links, but never by decreasing some
intensities.
Now, consider the set of unweighted directed networks, {g ∈ G : gii = 0, ∀i ∈ N;
gij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ N}. Examples for the formation of such networks can be found
in Bala and Goyal (2000) (see outcome rule IV). They extensively analyze four models
that are called one-way flow model and two-way flow model with or without decay. Let
us quickly discuss the interpretation of our result for those models. For concreteness,
consider the one-way flow model without decay (OW-model). By i  j we denote that
there exists a directed path from agent i to agent j in a network g, that is a sequence of
distinct agents i0 , i1 , ..., iT such that i0 = i, iT = j and ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1} it holds that
git ,it+1 = 1. Let µi (g) := #{j 6= i : i  j}. Then the one-way flow model is defined as
uOW
(g) = φ(µi (g), di(g)), where φ is increasing in the first and decreasing in the second
i
argument. Thus, agents face a trade-off between maintaining costly (outgoing) links and
receiving benefits of connections (via outgoing paths).
All four models satisfy positive externalities in unilateral network formation. Clearly,
~ in the OW-model means for some passive player k ∈ N \ {i} that his
establishing a link ij
number of outgoing links dk (g) has not changed, while his number of connections µk (g)
might increase. Bala and Goyal (2000) find a large number of Nash stable networks (more
than 20,000 for n = 6), but only a few of them (two) are strict Nash equilibria. Theorem 7
directly implies that deletion of links in one of the Nash stable networks cannot make any
player better off. In any of the four models, the empty network ~g ∅ := [0]i,j∈N is Nash
stable for quite a parameter range, i.e. for φ(x + 1, x) < φ(1, 0) ∀x ∈ {0, ..., n − 1} in the
OW-model. However, there might be other Nash stable networks for those parameters,
e.g. the wheel network if φ(n, 1) > φ(1, 0) is satisfied in addition. Since the empty network
is a subnetwork of any other network, Theorem 7 implies that the stable networks have at
least as high welfare as the empty network. In the particular case of the OW-model with
φ(n, 1) > φ(1, 0), the wheel network is uniquely efficient according to utilitarian welfare,
as Bala and Goyal (2000) show.
In this model, as in the three other models, there is also some parameter range where the
empty network is uniquely efficient, i.e. for φ(n, 1) < φ(1, 0). As a trivial implication of
Theorem 7, we can conclude that there is no tension (between stability and efficiency)
in such a setting because any non-empty network is over-connected and thus must be
unstable. In fact, Bala and Goyal (2000) show that myopic best-response dynamics lead
to the empty network in various settings. In parameter settings, where the empty network
is not efficient, we can interpret these dynamics as leading to an under-connected network
due to positive externalities. In the models with two-way flow and/or decay externalities
and the consequences of externalities become even more apparent.
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6

Concluding Remarks

We have introduced the notion of over-connected and under-connected networks in order
to contribute to a better understanding of the tension between stability and efficiency
in situations of strategic network formation. A network that is over-connected can be
socially improved by the deletion of links; a network that is under-connected can be
socially improved by the addition of links. In that way we can relate inefficient outcomes
to externalities of link formation.
The basic argument is that positive spillovers/externalities lead to situations where agents
are not willing to form links, although it would be collectively beneficial. Negative
externalities have the opposite effect: agents form links without internalizing their harm
for other agents. Without restricting to any specific network formation model, we have
shown the following: for positive externalities, no stable network can be over-connected.
For negative externalities no stable network can be under-connected when some other
conditions are met. Thus, the inefficient networks in one setting can be improved by the
addition of links, while the inefficient networks in the other setting can be improved
by the severance of links. Furthermore, we have restated those central results in a
more general framework, which includes the formation of weighted networks and the
formation of directed networks. Those results are strong enough to exclude that in a
stable network any agent can be made better off by decreasing (respectively increasing)
the intensity/strength of some links.
Despite their intuitive character, our results are not trivial. It must be noted that
externalities are not the only source of inefficiency. Other sources of inefficiencies in
the bilateral formation of links are miscoordination of actions in the Consent Game,
restrictions on possible deviations, and rejection power in the Consent Game. The first
issue can be solved by considering stability concepts that build on pairwise stability as
defined in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The second, however, is a problem of pairwise
stability itself since links are considered one by one. A set of links can have contrary
effects than each single link. For example, Theorem 1 needs a concavity assumption to
rule out this source of inefficiency that potentially could point into a different direction
than externalities. The third case of inefficiency can be illustrated in the example where a
player rejects a link although the partner would have benefited heavily from it. This can be
ruled out by the introduction of transfers or a property called pairwise sign compatibility
(as shown in Theorem 3 and 4). In our work we have not addressed empirical and
experimental evidence on the formation of networks with externalities. Kosfeld (2004)
provides a survey of network experiments suggesting that, besides individual incentives,
considerations of efficiency or “fairness” might also play a role.
In this paper we have shown that positive externalities tend to induce under-connected
networks, while negative externalities tend to induce over-connected networks. The
contribution of our results is two-fold. Firstly, they shed light into the general tension
between stability and efficiency giving a social planner a clear signal in which situations
to impede and in which situations it is gainly to promote the formation of relationships.
Secondly, the results can be used in specific models to improve the characterization of
stable and efficient networks. We have illustrated this with a few examples, while there are
many other models of strategic network formation that meet the required conditions. In
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particular, our results do not rely on assumptions of homogeneous agents or on restrictions
to unweighted and undirected networks. We hope that future research will come up
with more interesting models accounting for the various nature of social and economic
relationships.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 2. (Hellmann (2009))
The following statements are equivalent:
(1) u is convex (concave) in own links.
(2) u is convex (concave) in own new links.
(3) u is concave (convex) in own current links.
The proof is provided in Hellmann (2009).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let g ∈ [P S(u)] and suppose that u satisfies positive externalities
and concavity. We show that for all g 0 ⊂ g it holds that ui (g 0) ≤ ui (g) for all i ∈ N. Let
l := l(g, g 0) = g \ g 0 for some g 0 ⊂ g, and denote li := li (g, g 0) = l ∩ Li (g) and l−i := l \ li .
Since g is pairwise stable, all owners of a link prefer to have all their links in g, i.e.
ui(g) ≥ ui (g \ ij) for all j : ij ∈ li . By Lemma 2 concavity in own links is equivalent
to
P convexity in own current links, and thus it holds: ui(g) − ui (g \ li ) = mui (g, li) ≥
ij∈li mui (g, ij) ≥ 0. Hence, ui (g) ≥ ui (g \ li ).

Since u satisfies positive externalities, it holds for g̃ := g \ li that ui (g̃) ≥ ui(g̃ \ l−i )
(because player i does not own a link in l−i ), i.e. l−i ∩ Li (g) = ∅). Therefore: ui(g) ≥
ui(g \ li ) ≥ u((g \ li ) \ l−i ) = u(g 0). The same argument holds for all i ∈ N, implying that
w(g) ≥ w(g 0) for any welfare function satisfying monotonicity.

Proof of Theorem 2. P
Let g be pairwise
P stable with transfers. We show that for
0
all g 0 ⊂ g it holds that
u
(g
)
≤
i∈N i
i∈N ui (g). Suppose that u satisfies positive
0
externalities and concavity. For g ⊂ g, let l := l(g, g 0) := g \ g 0 and for each i ∈ N let
li := li (g, g 0) := l ∩ Li (g 0) and l−i := l−i (g, g 0) := l \ li . Given these definitions we have to
show that
X
X
X
ui(g) −
ui(g 0 ) =
mui (g, l) ≥ 0.
(5)
i∈N

i∈N

i∈N

Since u satisfies positive externalities, it holds for all i ∈ N that:
ui(g 0 ) ≤ ui(g 0 ∪ l−i ).

(6)

Concavity is equivalent to convexity in own current links which implies for all i ∈ N:
X
mui (g, ij).
(7)
mui (g, li) ≥
ij∈li
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Now, since g is pairwise stable with transfers (2), (6) and (7) imply:
X

(6)

mui (g, l) ≥

i∈N

X

mui (g, li)

i∈N

(7)

≥

X X

mui (g, ij)

i∈N j:ij∈li

(∗)

=

X

(2)

[mui (g, ij) + muj (g, ij)] ≥ 0.

ij∈l

To see why equality
P (*) holds, consider a link ij ∈ l: the
P link appears only in li
and lj and thus k6=i,j 1{ij∈lk } [ui (g ∪ ij) − ui (g)] = 0 and k∈N 1{ij∈lk } [ui (g ∪ ij) −

u
(g)]
The equality (*) thus holds because
i
j (g). P
 − uP

P P= ui (g ∪ ij) − ui(g) + uj (g ∪ ij)
1
[u
(g
∪
ij)
−
u
(g)]
=
1{ij∈lk } [ui (g ∪ ij) − ui (g)] =
{ij∈lk } i
i
ij∈l
k∈N
k∈N
ij∈l

P
P
k∈N
j:kj∈lk [ui (g ∪ ij) − ui (g)] . Hence, the sum of marginal utilities of any set of
links is non-negative, implying the proposition.
Proof of Remark 1. Let g ∈ G̃ such that it is stable according to one of the stability
concepts, i.e. g ∈ [P S(u)] ∪ [P S t (u)]. Since u satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 on G̃, we can show equivalently to both proofs that for all ḡ ⊂ g it holds that
w u (ḡ) ≤ w u (g), since any ḡ ⊂ g is by assumption contained in G̃.
Proof of Lemma 1. By Lemma 2 it suffices to show that uCO satisfies convexity in
own
links, that is ∀i ∈ N, ∀g ∈ G, and ∀l ⊆ Li (g), it holds that muCO
i (g, l) ≥
P current
CO
mu
(g,
ij).
i
ij∈l
Denote κi (g, l) := {k ∈ N : dik (g) < dik (g \ l)} as the set of agents whose distance to
agent i increases when deleting the set of links l from network g. Since distances cannot
decrease when deleting links, we can rewrite marginal utility in the following way:
X
X
X
X
dik (g)
dik (g\l)
muCO
(g,
l)
=
w
+
δ
w
−
c
−
[w
+
δ
w
−
cim ]
ii
ik
ik
ii
ik
i
k:ik∈g

k6=i

=

X

(δ dik (g) − δ dik (g\l) )wik −

k6=i

X

m:im∈g\l

cij .

ij∈l

k∈κi (g,l)

Now, consider some network g, some player i and some set of player i’s links l ⊆ Li (g).
Suppose that |l| ≥ 2.28
P
CO
To show the claim, let us assume the contrary, i.e. muCO
i (g, l) <
ij∈l mui (g, ij) .
28

For |l| < 2 the claim mui (g, l) ≥

P

ij∈l

mui (g, ij) trivially holds.
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mui (g, l) <

X

mui (g, ij)

ij∈l

k∈κi (g,ij)

ij∈l

X

(δ

dik (g)

−δ

dik (g\l)

)wik −

X

cij <

ij∈l

k∈κi (g,l)

X

(δ dik (g) − δ dik (g\l) )wik <

X
X

X

X

(δ dik (g) − δ dik (g\ij) )wik − cij
(δ dik (g) − δ dik (g\ij) )wik



(8)

ij∈l k∈κi (g,ij)

k∈κi (g,l)

To see that Eq. 8 cannot hold, note the following three properties of geodesic distances
that were already used in Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2007):
1. ∀k ∈ N and ∀ij ∈ l, it holds that (δ dik (g) − δ dik (g\l) )wik ≥ (δ dik (g) − δ dik (g\ij) )wik .
2. For all ij, im ∈ l, it holds that κi (g, ij) ∩ κi (g, im) = ∅.
S
3. ij∈l κi (g, ij) ⊆ κi (g, l).

Thus, we conclude that mui (g, l) ≥

P

ij∈l

mui (g, ij).

Proposition 4. In the symmetric connections model, g T etra is under-connected with
respect to the utilitarian welfare function for any parameters δ and c, for which g T etra
is pairwise stable.
Proof. We have to show that if δ and c are such that g T etra ∈ P S(uδ,c), then ∃g 0 ⊃ g T etra
for which wδ,c (g 0) > wδ,c (g T etra ). Specifically, we show that the condition
c ≤ δ − δ 8 + δ 2 − δ 7 + δ 3 − δ 6 + 2(δ 4 − δ 5 ) := ub

(9)

is necessary for stability, but sufficient for wδ,c (g T etra ∪ 26) > wδ,c (g T etra). The label of the
players correspond to figure 1.
The first part was done in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) already. Suppose that c > ub,
then player 1 benefits from cutting 12 (because his change in benefits is just ub).
P
P
T etra )
dij (g T etra ∪26)
For the second part denote by βi P
:=
− j6=i δ dij (g
the marginal
j6=i δ
benefits for player i and by ∆ := i∈N βi the sum of marginal benefits. This allows to
write
wδ,c (g T etra ∪ 26) > wδ,c (g T etra) ⇐⇒ ∆ > 2c.
(10)
It is straightforward to derive that
β1
β2
β3
β4
β7

=
=
=
=
=

β8 = δ 2 − δ 4 + δ 3 − δ 4
β6 = δ − δ 5 + δ 2 − δ 4 + δ 2 − δ 5 + 2(δ 3 − δ 4 )
δ2 − δ5 + δ3 − δ4 + δ3 − δ5
β9 = β10 = β11 = δ 3 − δ 4
δ2 − δ5 + δ3 − δ4 + δ3 − δ5,
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and βi = 0 for all other i.
This yields
∆ = 2(δ − δ 5 ) + 4(δ 2 − δ 4 ) + 4(δ 2 − δ 5 ) + 12(δ 3 − δ 4 ) + 2(δ 3 − δ 5 ).

(11)

To show that ∆ > 2c under the condition c ≤ ub, it is sufficient to show that ∆ > 2ub
holds. Recall that,
2ub(g) = 2(δ − δ 8 ) + 2(δ 2 − δ 7 ) + 2(δ 3 − δ 6 ) + 4(δ 4 − δ 5 ).

(12)

∆ > 2ub ⇐⇒ 6δ 2 + 12δ 3 − 20δ 4 − 4δ 5 + 2δ 6 + 2δ 7 + 2δ 8 > 0

(13)

Thus,
Numerically it can be checked that (13) holds for all δ ∈ (0, 1) (we used Maple).

Proof of Theorem
3. Let g P
be pairwise stable with transfers. We show that for all g 0 ⊃ g
P
it holds that i∈N ui(g 0 ) ≤ i∈N ui (g). Suppose that u satisfies negative externalities
and concavity. For g 0 ⊃ g, let l := g 0 \ g and for each i ∈ N let li = l ∩ Li (g 0) and
l−i := l \ li (g, g 0). Since u satisfies negative externalities, it holds for all i ∈ N that:
ui (g 0) ≤ ui (g 0 \ l−i ).

(14)

Concavity is equivalent to concavity in own new links, which implies for all i ∈ N:
X
ui (g ∪ ij) − ui (g).
(15)
ui (g ∪ li ) − ui(g) ≤
j:ij∈li

Now, since g is pairwise stable with transfers, (14) and (15) imply:
X
X
(ui (g 0 ) − ui (g)) =
(ui (g ∪ li ∪ l−i ) − ui (g))
i∈N

i∈N

(14)

≤

X

(ui (g ∪ li ) − ui(g))

i∈N

(15)

≤

X

(∗)

X

i∈N

=

X

j:ij∈li


[ui (g ∪ ij) − ui (g)]

(2)

ui (g ∪ ij) − ui(g) + uj (g ∪ ij) − uj (g) ≤ 0,

ij∈l

where the equality (*) holds because for each link ij ∈ l it holds that ij ∈ l1 (k) if and
only if k ∈ {i, j} and only links in l are considered.
Proof of Theorem 4. We show first [P S(u)] ⊆ [P S t (u)], and then [P S(u)] ⊇ [P S t(u)].
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‘⊆’ Let g be pairwise stable. By pairwise stability we get for all ij ∈ g that ui(g \ ij) ≤
ui (g) and uj (g \ ij) ≤ uj (g), hence ui (g \ ij) + uj (g \ ij) ≤ ui (g) + uj (g). Further it
holds by pairwise stability for all ij 6∈ g that either ui (g) = ui(g ∪ ij) and uj (g) =
uj (g ∪ij) or for one of the two involved players i or j: ui (g) > ui (g ∪ij). In the latter
case PSC implies also uj (g) > uj (g ∪ ij), hence ui(g ∪ ij) + uj (g ∪ ij) ≤ ui (g) + uj (g),
implying that g is pairwise stable with transfers.
‘⊇’ Let g be pairwise stable with transfers. Then it holds for all ij ∈ g that ui(g \
ij) + uj (g \ ij) ≤ ui (g) + uj (g), hence ui(g \ ij) ≤ ui(g) for at least one of the two
involved players. By PSC it has to hold that also uj (g \ ij) ≤ uj (g), satisfying the
first condition for pairwise stability. Further, pairwise stability with transfer implies
for all ij 6∈ g that ui (g ∪ ij) + uj (g ∪ ij) ≤ ui (g) + uj (g). Thus ui (g ∪ ij) ≤ ui(g) for
at least one of the two players. By PSC however this has to hold also for the other
player, i.e. uj (g ∪ ij) ≤ uj (g). Hence, g is also pairwise stable.

Proof of Remark 2. Let g ∈ G̃ be pairwise stable with transfers. Since for all g 0 ⊃ g
it holds that g 0 ∈ G̃, and u satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3 on G̃, we can show
equivalently to the proof of Theorem 3 that for all ḡ ⊃ g it holds that w u (ḡ) ≤ w u (g).
We get the analogous result for pairwise stability if PSC is satisfied by Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 5. We have to show that for all g 0 ⊃ g the following holds:
∃i ∈ N : ui (g 0) > 0 ⇒ ∃j ∈ N : uj (g 0 ) < uj (g).
Similarly to the above proofs, for g 0 ⊃ g let l = g 0 \ g, li = l ∩ Li (g 0 ) and l−i = l \ li .
Let N(l) := {i ∈ N : li 6= ∅} be the set of players who are involved in at least one link
in l. Suppose that uk (g 0) = uk (g) for all k ∈
/ N(l) (otherwise the result is immediately
established because of non-positive externalities). Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3,
concavity and negative externalities imply for all i ∈ N:
(14)

(15)

ui (g 0 ) − ui (g) ≤ ui (g ∪ li ) − ui(g) ≤

X

ui(g ∪ ij) − ui (g).

(16)

j:ij∈li

Thus, for g 0 to be Pareto preferred to g there has to exist an i : ui (g 0) > ui(g) and thus
because of (16) there has to exist i1 ∈ N: ui (g ∪ii1 ) > ui (g). But then because of pairwise
stability of g: ui1 (g ∪ ii1 ) < ui1 (g). However, for i1 to have ui1 (g 0 ) ≥ ui1 (g), there has to
exist an i2 such that ui (g ∪ i1 i2 ) > ui(g), since (16) holds and already ui1 (g ∪ ii1 ) < ui1 (g).
Continuing in this manner, for g 0 to be Pareto preferred to g, there has to exists sequence
(ik )k=1,...,K of pairwise distinct players ik ∈ N(l) such that uik (g ∪ ik ik+1 ) > uik (g). By
pairwise stability of g, muik (g ∪ ik ik+1 , ik ik+1 ) > 0 implies muik+1 (g ∪ ik+1 ik , ik+1ik ) < 0
for all k = 1, ..., K − 1. Since transitivity of negative marginal utility in new links holds,
and muik+1 (g ∪ ik+1 ik ) < 0 for all k = 1, ..., K − 1, we get that muik (g ∪ ik ij ) < 0 for all
j < k, and thus ik ∈
/ {i, i1 , ..., ik−1 }, and hence K ≤ |N(l)|. But since N(l) is finite, we
get for the last player iK in the sequence:
(14)

(15)

uiK (g 0) − uiK (g) ≤ uiK (g ∪ liK ) − uiK (g) ≤

X

uiK (g ∪ ij) − uiK (g) < 0,

j:iK j∈liK
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since uiK (g ∪ ij) − uiK (g) < 0 for all j ∈ {i, i1 , ..., iK−1 }. Thus, if there exists a i ∈ N such
that ui (g 0) > ui(g), then there has to exist a player j such that uj (g 0 ) < uj (g), completing
the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3. We show here the obvious, that a regular pairwise stable network
is also pairwise stable with transfers, the remaining is implied by Theorem 3. If the utility
function satisfies (4) and the network is regular, then all players receive the same utility
since all arguments of the utility functions are equal. Alike are the marginal utilities of
any two involved players from forming a link. Since g is pairwise stable, we have for any
i, j ∈ N: mui (g ∪ij, ij) = muj (g ∪ij, ij) ≤ 0, and thus mui (g ∪ij, ij)+muj (g ∪ij, ij) ≤ 0,
implying pairwise stability with transfers. In the star for any two peripheral players same
considerations hold.
Proof of Proposition 1. All pairwise stable networks consist of completely connected
components that can be ordered according to size such that each larger component of
size m satisfies m > n2 , where n is the size of the smaller component. There cannot be
singleton components, since each player is better off connecting to some player than to
none, and each player i wants a link to a player j, for whom dj ≤ di . Note that this implies
that there exists at least one component of size 3 if n ≥ 3. Since any even sized network of
n/2 separate pairs and any odd sized network of (n − 2)/2 pairs and the remaining three
players being connected by 2 links is strongly efficient, it is also component efficient for
any component of size n and, hence, strictly welfare better than any completely connected
component of at least size 3. For the exact calculations see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Hence any completely connected component of size 3 or larger contains a welfare better
subcomponent, whereas a completely connected component of size 2 is component welfare
maximizing, implying the result.
ρ
Proof of Proposition 2. Let c < (ρ+2k+2)(ρ+2k)
, then for the welfare maximizing number
∗
of links it holds that 1/2D (g) ≥ k. Since any network, which contains 1/2D ∗(g) links is
welfare maximizing, any network, which has less than 1/2D ∗(g) links is under-connected.
By Theorem 3 no pairwise stable network can be under-connected since uP R satisfies
negative externalities and concavity. Thus, any network g ∈ [P S t ] has to contain at least
1/2D ∗(g) ≥ k links.

Proof of Theorem 6. Given some outcome function Ψ that satisfies rejection power,
let there be a society (N, GΨ , u) such that u satisfies positive externalities in bilateral
network formation. Let g ∈ [NS(u)] and let g 0 < g. We show that then ui (g 0) ≤ ui (g) for
all i ∈ N.
i
i
0
For each i ∈ N let g i ∈ GΨ be such that gkl
= gkl for all k, l 6= i and gkl
= gkl
otherwise.
i
Note that g <i g. Since Ψ satisfies rejection power, we get that each i can change
strategies such that g i is induced. By Nash stability we get that ui (g) ≥ ui (g i).
i
0
It remains to show that for all i, ui (g i) ≥ ui (g 0). For all k, l ∈ N let δkl = gkl
− gkl
be the
i
0
i
differences in link intensity between g and g . Note that by construction of g it holds
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δkl = 0 if k = i or l = i and δkl ≥ 0, since g 0 < g. By positive externalities, we get that
ui(g i ) ≥ ui (g 0 ), since g i = g 0(∓kl )k,l∈N δkl and δkl = 0 if k = i.
Thus, ui (g) ≥ ui (g i) ≥ ui (g 0) for all i ∈ N implying that w(g) ≥ w(g 0) for any welfare
function satisfying monotonicity.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let the outcome rule Ψ be unilateral such that gij = ψ(sij ) for
all i, j ∈ N. We show the result for positive externalities, while the proof for negative
externalities works identically. Let g ∈ [NS(u)]. We show that for all g 0 ∈ GΨ such that
g 0 < g, it holds that ui(g 0 ) ≤ ui (g) for all i ∈ N. Let g̃ ∈ GΨ such that g̃kl = gkl for all
0
k 6= i and g̃kl = gkl
if k = i.
Step 1: Since g is Nash stable, there exists s ∈ Ψ−1 (g) such that s is a Nash equilbrium
in the corresponding game Γ. Let s̃i := (s̃ij )j∈N with s̃ij ∈ ψ −1 (gij0 ) (that is a strategy
of player i that creates all his outgoing links as in g 0 ). By construction it holds that
(s−i , s̃i) ∈ Ψ−1 (g̃). Since s is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that ui(Ψ(s)) ≥ ui(Ψ(s−i , s̃i )) ⇔
ui(g) ≥ ui (g̃).
Step 2: It remains to show that ui(g̃) ≥ ui (g 0 ). This is however directly implied by positive
externalities, since g̃ = g 0 (+kl )k,l∈N δkl such that δkl = 0 if k = i and δkl ≥ 0 for all k, l ∈ N
(by the construction of g̃).
step1

step2

Thus, we have shown that ui(g) ≥ ui(g̃) ≥ ui (g 0). The same argument holds for all
i ∈ N, implying that w(g) ≥ w(g 0) for any welfare function satisfying monotonicity.
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